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abstract: The concept of “the body without organs” takes up a great 
part of the oeuvre of Deleuze and Guattari. Yet, it is difficult to answer 
their question–“How do you make yourself a body without organs?”–or 
to understand their answer. In this paper I propose that the body without 
organs is an ethical concept. To support this assertion, I relate, especially, 
Deleuze’s thought on the Norwegian author Karl Ove Knausgård’s auto-
fictive project, My Struggle, suggesting that My Struggle can be read as 
a body without organs. By doing so, I aim at two things: first, to illustrate 
a possible application of Deleuze’s ethic, and second, to show how such 
an ethic may guide us regarding what we ought to do.
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INTRODUCTION
The title of this paper –“How do you make a body without organs?”– 
refers to one of the plateau’s in Deleuze and Guattari’s book, A Thousand 
Plateaus. I wish to use this strange concept, the “body without organs,” 
or “BwO,” as my starting point while trying to demonstrate how it opens 
up the possibility of an alternative ethical practice.
The BwO was adopted from the French writer Antonin Artaud and 
first appeared in Deleuze’s Logic of Sense, then in Anti-Oedipus (written 
with Guattari), Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, and A Thousand 
Plateaus (written with Guattari).1 Each variation makes the concept 
more ethical; referring to Spinoza’s Ethics, Deleuze and Guattari write, 
“Is not Ethics the greatest book of the Body without Organs?” (Deleuze 
and Guattari quoted from Shaw 2016, 162).
Next I wish to ask, in what way is the BwO ethical?
“Ethics,” according to Deleuze, “either makes no sense at all, or this 
is what it means and has nothing else to say: not to be unworthy of what 
happens to us” (Deleuze 2014, 169, italics added).
Unlike morality, which refers to a set of transcendent values or norms, 
ethics is understood here as an immanent practice or style of life charac-
terized by an ongoing exploration of what might be possible (Deleuze 
2002; Smith 2011). Thus, the term “not to be unworthy of what happens 
to us” is related to accepting or meeting what affects us and how we might 
incorporate it in a beneficial way, in which beneficial does not refer to 
any pre-existing transcendent moral categories.
I would argue that such an ethic has affinities with creative writing, 
which means that it has a lot to do with how the writer is receptive and 
absorbs what happens to him or her. To qualify this idea, I relate the 
concept of BwO to the Norwegian writer Karl Ove Knausgård’s six-
volume auto-fictional project entitled My Struggle. In that immense liter-
ary project, he struggles to accept that he has the beliefs, feelings, and 
thoughts that he deserves given his way of being (Deleuze 2002, 1). 
Knausgård writes to overcome a way of being that he finds morally re-
1 Smith (2012, 320) draws a map of the development of and changes in the BwO. 
I regard all the definitions as part of the same, that is, a “model for the unconscious 
itself,” yet not as something we should or ought to become conscious of, but rather 
as a way of living in this schizophrenic or pre-personal state of trying to be worthy of 
what happens.
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stricted, controlled, and too rationalized by science (Knausgård 2011). 
To liberate himself, Knausgård creates a fictional room where he can 
experiment with a possible version of himself, becomes many – receive 
and absorb – by allowing his memories to diverge from any fixed moral 
standard as well as questions the certainty of his memories. For example, 
he stresses: “Happiness is not my objective” (Knausgård 2011); rather, 
his objective is to examine a life in all its complexity. This approach, I 
argue, resembles the concept of BwO.
For example, in Anti-Oedipus (2000b, 21), the BwO is described as 
“an egg,” which illustrates a state in between being and non-being. An 
egg is a potential still to be actualized; it is in a constant process of becom-
ing. Equally, Knausgård is both being constituted by reality and constitut-
ing it.
There is a radical openness in the BwO. It emphasizes that we do not 
know what it will turn into, what it will be capable of, if anything. Also, 
it – at least I read it this way – refers to Deleuze’s often repeated Spinozean 
claim: We do not know what the body is capable of doing. The question 
“How do you make yourself a body without organs?” is, therefore, an 
ethical question. That is to say, how can we freely become whatever, 
instead of imprisoning ourselves by following predefined norms of how 
we should, ought, or must live (or remember our past)?
The BwO is a way of truly exploring what we are capable of. The 
BwO is a body full of uncertainty, a what if concept.
Thus, I propose that the BwO is ethical qua experimental: “The crea-
tion of this body without organs is a process that one cannot ever be 
completely ‘done with’ ” (Murphy 2016, 141).2 The experimental process 
consists of two elements that work alongside one another: (1) the consti-
tution of experience and (2) the constitution of reality.
I will briefly relate these two steps to Knausgård’s six-volume auto-
fictional project, My Struggle. In other words, I refer to Knausgård for 
one reason only: as an example of how one can become a BwO.
2 Similarly, Knausgård claimed that after finishing My Struggle, he would stop 
writing. Nevertheless, he continued, emphasizing that everything in life is a work in 
progress.
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THE BWO
In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari write:
We come to the gradual realization that the BwO is not at all the opposite 
of the organs. The organs are not the enemy. The enemy is the organism. The 
BwO is opposed not to the organs but to that organization of the organs called 
organism (2000a, 158).
With that quote, they deny the idea of following a purpose, an objec-
tive, or a master plan. Our body language and posture are often socialized 
by the norms and conventions of society. As an alternative, the BwO puts 
an end to such ultimate objectives that represent an already ordered map 
(i.e., a metaphysics of being). Contrary to this, Deleuze and Guattari assert 
that the “BwO is what remains when you take everything away ... popu-
lated only by intensities” (2000a, 151, 153).
The BwO confronts us with a problem of organization, that is, how 
we should, ought to, or must organize our lives, without reducing eve-
rything to the same organism.
To organize is to make things fit, even things that cannot fit. Or-
ganization functions like a funnel; diverging ideas are gradually managed 
as though being squeezed through the same hole, pointed toward the same 
objectives or fantasies. For example, in much management and organiza-
tional literature, the starting point is to create a clear objective or vision, 
then you organize your resources with reference to these. The BwO, on 
the other hand, is a multiplicity. It is something that takes place, any 
place, potentially pointing in all directions. There is, apparently, no clear 
entrance and exit; rather, there are different moments where life intersects 
with various intensity.
In his work on Francis Bacon, Deleuze writes:
Sensation is vibration. We know that the egg reveals just this state of the 
body “before” organic representation: axes and vectors, gradients, zones, cin-
ematic movements, and dynamic tendencies, in relation to which forms are 
contingent or accessory. “No mouth. No tongue. No teeth. No larynx. No 
esophagus. No belly. No anus.” It is a whole nonorganic life, for the organism 
is not life, it is what imprisons life (2003, 44-47).
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The organs are not the problem; the only problem is how the major-
ity tends to organize them to perform or function in a specific way (e.g., 
managing by objectives).
In today’s achievement society, we tend to focus on objectives, which 
far too easily can make any kind of organization moralizing (i.e., indi-
vidual or societal), telling the organs how they ought to, should, or have 
to work, instead of suggesting how they might organize themselves (Jan-
ning 2015).
“The word experimental is apt, providing it is not understood as de-
scriptive of an act to be later judged in terms of success and failure, but 
simply as of an act the outcome of which is unknown” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1983, 371; Shaw 2016, 172).
Thus, to become a BwO is to trust or have faith in each organ’s capa-
bility of being flexible enough to find its, or their, own way, when 
needed. This point is perhaps best illustrated by referring to Artaud’s use 
of the concept, without suggesting that Deleuze and Guattari’s reading 
or use agrees. In 1947, Artaud wrote, “When you have given him a body 
without organs, then you will have delivered him from all his automatisms 
and restored him his true liberty” (Artaud quoted from Shaw 2016, 177).
Although a moral baseline of right and wrong in a society helps us 
understand and see how life typically works, the exact same baseline may 
also hinder us from seeing the free flow of information and knowledge 
that passes through as intensities. We become less open. Our vision be-
comes automatized. We keep certain forces or alternative life forms im-
prisoned due to our blindness or our unwillingness to make room for 
something new, or simply by deliberately referring to how things nor-
mally function, following the habit of following habits. Seen in this light, 
the BwO is also a critique of what Moore (1903, 10) called the “natural-
istic fallacy” as an attempt to deduce norms from facts, for example that 
drug users tend to live shorter lives with a higher risk of becoming 
criminals, etc. Such deductions are not wrong per se; rather, the point is 
that Deleuze and Guattari do not commit themselves to such deductions. 
Instead, they evaluate a life as a singularity. It is in that sense that we speak 
about an immanent ethics, or that we do not see the unconscious as 
something dangerous qua unknown but rather as a potential, an egg.
The BwO, therefore, is a free organization of a life with life. And, as 
it is free, it can, at least potentially, become whatever. Hereby, we move 
away from morality to ethics.
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BELIEVE IN THIS WORLD
Ethics is to be worthy of what happens, Deleuze wrote in The Logic 
of Sense. Ethics is a way of life worthy of accepting what life has to offer, 
not worthy in the sense that you should live up to certain ideals or norms 
but rather that you are capable of embracing what actually comes to oc-
cur. Regardless of what happens, you should still believe in this world. 
There is no other world.
The modern fact is that we no longer believe in this world. We do not even 
believe in the events which happen to us, love, death, as if they only half con-
cerned us ... We need an ethic or a faith, which makes fools laugh; it is not a 
need to believe in something else, but a need to believe in this world, of which 
fools are a part (Deleuze 2000, 171, 173).
The task is to establish or reestablish a belief, but “not in a different 
world, but in the link between man and the world, in love or life, to 
believe in this as in the impossible, the unthinkable, which none the less 
cannot but be thought: ‘something possible, otherwise I will suffocate’ ” 
(Deleuze 2000, 170).
In order not to suffocate, you must breathe. “A mastery of the breath 
... leads to mastery over the body,” suggests Artaud (Shaw 2016, 162). 
To breathe may not establish a belief in this world, but it is vital. It keeps 
you in this world as well as it shows how an immanent ethical practice 
is finite: “For the heart life is simple: It beats for as long as it can. Then 
it stops” (Knausgård 2011).
To believe, therefore, is to sense the vibrations of life equally, to become 
with them, move alongside the vibrations. In My Struggle, Knausgård 
pays attention to all aspects of life in the same neutral way: A quarrel 
with his wife is described as carefully as putting gas in his car or cleaning 
the house (Knausgård 2013).3 Hereby, the Norwegian writer exhibits 
how a belief in this world requires attention and awareness to the extent 
that the person observing becomes completely one with or indistinguish-
able from what is happening, that is, what is being observed. He becomes, 
which is an ethical practice. Becoming with touches upon “the ethical 
3 Similarly, the primatologist Frans de Waal (2009, 211) does not link empathy 
with morality; instead, he writes, “taking another’s perspective is a neutral capacity. 
It can serve both constructive and destructive ends.”
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imperative to engage with the present and be ‘worthy’ of it” (Braidotti 
2011, 16).
The question of interest is how to make yourself a BwO.
THE SELFLESSNESS OF KNAUSGÅRD
Knausgård’s idea of writing is as a way of becoming worthy of what 
has happened and happens to him. To become with is an engaged 
practiced, a willed practiced that is initiated by life itself. To become with 
is not to become somebody specific, that is, not to adopt a certain iden-
tity or moral profile. Knausgård (2011) writes, “... by writing I wanted 
to open the world for myself”– to be affected by the world.
In an exchange with James Woods, Knausgård describes the writing 
process as a filtering process that brings him closer to reality:
Now, I don’t really pay much attention to the world. I’m not very present. 
I’m detached from almost everything. I’m very occupied with myself and my 
own mind. I’m not in connection with the world–but in writing, I can be. 
That’s a way for me to open a world up (Knausgård 2013. My italics).
Through the process of writing, the author is able to turn his sensation 
from merely inward looking to outward looking. It is in the process of 
writing itself, which helps him to open or unfold the world as a way of 
actualizing what is there as a potential. The criterion is not whether the 
writing is good or relevant; rather, it is to allow the writing and the world 
to merge. The link between life and writing is a question of credibility.
Knausgård’s My Struggle consists of six volumes. Each volume con-
cerns a different part of the author’s life, spanning from early childhood 
in volume three to the young man becoming a writer in volume four to 
more present-day issues that also include other people looking at him. 
He accepts the chaos and insecurity regarding who he is and was as being 
part of a life. Contrary to contemporary identity politics, he establishes 
a room in which different experiences – his own and others – can be 
expressed.
At first it seems a project to get over the death of his father and how 
Knausgård resembles his father. In an interview (Andrew O’Hagan, 2014), 
Knausgård said (referring to his father), “I had to get rid of him. That has 
been my project–to get rid of his presence inside me.” Yet, as he also men-
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tions in the first part of the work, it is an existential project. It is about a 
man struggling with becoming something other than what he is. For ex-
ample, in volume one, he mentions that although he is married and has 
children and was already quite successful as a writer, he is not happy. The 
whole project is a way a getting rid of everything, mainly because every-
thing seems to annoy him, except writing. For example, Knausgård (2011) 
notes how scientific explanations have killed the mystery of life. The result 
is a tiny claustrophobic world that he wishes to open. Writing, equally, 
requires that he is open, receptive, and ‘formable’. For him, to write, at 
least as he does in this project, is to make a BwO.
Knausgård wants to escape, leave behind, get rid of, but unlike a post-
modern writer such as Paul Auster, who plays with identities in order to 
become another person in particular, Knausgård tries – without knowing 
this, I assume – to become a BwO. That is free. He wants to move beyond 
the limited space (i.e., his memories and life conditions, etc.). He wants 
to write another, more liberating, story about himself, not necessarily a 
prettier one. For example, in volume two, Knausgård discusses his debut 
novel, Out of This World, with a good friend called Geir. The novel is 
about a teacher who is having an affair with a young girl of only 13 years 
of age. Now, in volume two, Geir tells Knausgård that he (Knausgård) 
had told him (Geir) about the affair long before the publication of the 
novel. “It felt like a hand squeezed around my heart. How was it possible 
that he could say this? Could I have repressed such a huge incident? Just 
hidden it away and forgotten all about it, and then written it down with-
out a moment of consideration whether it was correct? No. No, no, no. 
It was unthinkable” (Knausgård 2012). He then denies it, claiming that 
such an important thing cannot be repressed, and adds: “At the same 
time, I had big gaps in my memory, back then I had drank quite a lot ... 
all these holes, all this unconscious darkness during so many years ... and 
now when Geir told me that I had told him that I have had a relationship 
with a thirteen year old in Northern Norway, I could not with my hand 
on my heart say no, I did not, because there was doubt” (Knausgård 2012).
Knausgård might be an unreliable historian, yet what he is writing is 
a fictional project. Fiction becomes a tool with which to make various 
versions of something true. It illustrates what Bergson pointed out regard-
ing recollection and memory, that our memory is not something static 
hidden away in a drawer, but something created. Just as moral norms are 
social artefacts that change over time, Knausgård as a writer is uncertain 
about his own past. As Butler writes: “I am always recuperating, recon-
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structing, and I am left to fictionalize and fabulate origins I cannot know” 
(2005, 39). Instead of reducing a life’s complexity in order to give it one 
solid identity (and eliminate unattractive possibilities), Knausgård shares 
his doubt and uncertainty, whereby he – quite paradoxically – ends up 
saying something more significant about a life, something that I would 
argue is part of any practical ethic: how vulnerable life is.
In the interview with Andrew O’Hagan (2014), Knausgård is asked 
whether writing My Struggle had been “therapeutic,” whether it had 
helped him “conquer the fear” of his father. Knausgård said no. He went 
on to say, “It’s nothing like that to write, I think. To write is much more 
about becoming free of everything, becoming free of what you know.”
My Struggle is about freedom, similar to the BwO. He no longer 
wants to do what he can. He aims at becoming another. He has to let go. 
It is in the process of writing that the autobiographical becomes fictional. 
Becoming a BwO is about having the courage to take a step into the 
unknown. It is a way of enlarging, expanding, exploring everything as it 
was, is, and is going to be, to make room for it all.
That is an ethical practice because it debates not only what to know 
and not know but also with what certainty, if any, and whether any 
experience may or may not be defensible depending on one’s criteria.
In the fifth volume, he writes:
I was onto something important, all I had to do was stretch out for it. This 
was a vague feeling, nothing on which you could build, but all the same I knew 
I had something there. In the mist, in the darkness of the forest, in the dew 
drops on the spruce needles. In the whales that swam in the sea, in the heart 
beating in my breast. Mist, heart, blood, trees. Why were they so appealing? 
What was it that enticed me with such power? That filled me with such enor-
mous desire? Mist, heart, blood, trees. Oh, if only I could write about them, 
no, not write about them but make my writing be them, then I would be 
happy. Then I would have peace of mind (Knausgård 2013).
Make my writing be them. To write in order to be or become with 
the world, not to do anything specific, not to organize; rather, leave your 
organs and planning behind. Therefore, to be is to be with. That is to 
become.
For Deleuze, becoming is freedom. It has no end goal. Such freedom 
is not deep but expansive. It is not personal but impersonal. To become 
a BwO is to acknowledge that self-knowledge is integrated in the world. 
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You deceive yourself by not knowing the world around you. Or, if you 
do not know the world, you will never know yourself. And yet, the 
conclusion is even more radical. If the world and you resonate and become 
united, it is also because you are nothing other than what you become.
Knausgård gets to know himself as many things: son, father, friend, 
writer, lover, husband, failure, success, etc. However, the roles are never 
fixed or static. They change. He comes to accept that his struggle is two-
fold: First, he has to accept that he is all of them (the son, the father, the 
drunk, a potential criminal, etc.); second, as a consequence thereof, that 
he is selfless. He is no further away from Hitler (volume six) than he is 
from being a caring father. To both accept this and affirm it is how to 
make a BwO.
This creative approach does not remove our responsibility per se. 
After all, we are still accountable for how we relate to life. However, if 
to become worthy of what is happening to us marks an ethical approach 
to life, then responsibility should not be seen as how well we follow a set 
of moral categories; rather, it is determined by how we respond to or 
carry with us the wounds we encounter in life. “Lives are by definition 
precarious: they can be expunged at will or by accident” (Butler 2009, 
25). Knausgård, for example, acknowledges that a life embodies a poten-
tial for both creation and destruction. He decides which potential to ac-
tualize, which story to tell. His self is not an essence but is constantly 
becoming something else. I am always another, as Rimbaud famously 
said. “What something is, is given through the activity of differentiation” 
(Colebrook 2000, 87).
Thus, what is affirmed is the difference that makes everything else 
possible. To make yourself a BwO is to invent the conditions for non-
stop experimentation, for example, by writing quickly without editing 
as Knausgård wrote My Struggle but also through reading. Both prac-
tices can resemble a spiritual or religious experience of selflessness: “The 
main thing about religious ecstasy is a feeling of selflessness – that you 
yourself disappear. I feel that when I read Dostoyevsky. I can have that 
feeling. I can just disappear” (Knausgård 2014).
In discussing My Struggle by Knausgård, I have briefly illustrated how 
elements of Deleuze’s philosophy can be practiced, lived out, not by all of 
us becoming writers but by incorporating this particular approach to life–
ethics as an ongoing experiment. It is a way of paying attention neutrally 
or without judging beforehand in order to affirm what brings life. In this 
affirmative practice, an ethical life also becomes more artistic or poetic.
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DISCUSSION
Deleuze and the narration in Knausgård’s My Struggle share the same 
underlying metaphysic. On a basic level, they both accept that everything 
is constantly changing (i.e., the metaphysics of becoming). The process 
of making sense is a creative or inventive practice.
The awareness of the living, present moment is not anchored in the 
questions ‘What is?’ or ‘What does it mean?’ but in ‘How does it work?’ 
and ‘What is also possible?’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2000b, 102). Elsewhere, 
Deleuze says, “The ultimate aim of literature is to set free, in the delirium, 
this creation of a health or this invention of a people, that is, a possibility 
of life,” thereby, he emphasizes, to “write for this people who are missing 
... (‘for’ means less ‘in the place of’ than ‘for the benefit of’)” (Deleuze 
1998, 4). The obligation is to make ourselves available to life in order to 
follow that which brings joy, clarity, and peace.4 Toward the end of the 
project, Knausgård finds peace of mind as he realizes that he consists of 
the others, of the world.
Philosophy is a way of being alert – that is, constantly being aware, 
always being on the lookout, questioning our habits as well as all the 
conventional norms and ideas that guide our lives. A philosopher ex-
poses himself or herself to contact with life, not some predefined idea or 
knowledge of life:
Belief is no longer addressed to a different or transformed world. Man is in 
the world as if in a pure optical and sound situation. The reaction to which 
man has been disposed can be replaced only by belief. Only belief in the world 
can reconnect man to what he sees and hears (Deleuze 2000, 172).
Elsewhere, Deleuze writes:
A wave with a variable amplitude flows through the body without organs; 
it traces zones and levels on this body according to the variations of its amplitude. 
When the wave encounters external forces at a particular level, a sensation ap-
pears. An organ will be determined by this encounter, but it is a provisional 
4 The concept of joy can be found in Spinoza, just as concepts such as clarity and 
peace can be found in Wittgenstein. Deleuze, on the other hand, does not have any 
explicit philosophical objective; his immanent ethic is related to an ongoing process of 
becoming other. Still, joy, clarity, and peace appear to qualify as states to affirm in life.
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organ that endures only as long as the passage of the wave and the action of the 
force, and which will be displaced in order to be posited elsewhere. No organ 
is constant as regards either function or position... (Deleuze 2002, 44-47).
The process of becoming a BwO consists of the same two steps that 
make Deleuze’s philosophy affirmative. First, we need to establish a belief 
in this world – what I have referred to as paying attention neutrally – then 
we may notice how we are affected and, therefore, changed as a result of 
what we encounter. The second part is one of problematization or ex-
amination of what is happening, as well as how it is happening and why.
Deleuze is a philosopher who is more concerned with living (all forms 
of life) than with knowledge about living (the good life). That is also 
expressed in the BwO and in Knausgård’s project. For example, the organs, 
if understood morally (e.g., this is how this thing should be done), can 
prevent the body from re-organizing itself again and again; that inhibition 
can imprison life. The BwO is, on the contrary, constantly on the move. 
“Multiplicity, ritornello, sensation, etc., are all developed into pure con-
cepts, but strictly speaking, they are inseparable from the passage from 
one concept to another” (Deleuze 2006, 363).
The “passage” that Deleuze speaks of is from unconsciousness to 
consciousness. You are constantly located between those two states, since 
there is no true or natural order of things. To relate to what is in the 
midst of becoming, you need to be alert, to pay attention (to the condi-
tions of experience) and experiment with how things could be organized 
(i.e., the conditions of reality). “Nietzsche succeeded in making us un-
derstand, thought is creation, not will to truth” (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994, 64).
For instance, I suggest that Knausgård’s literary project is fueled not 
by a will to truth but by a will to create. It is that creative will that makes 
room for the truths to emerge. What makes My Struggle ethical is how 
the writer makes himself available to life: memories, reading, present 
occurrences, trends.
If Knausgård’s project can help us familiarize ourselves with Deleuze’s 
ethics, it is because My Struggle may be seen as a process of becoming 
with reality. It can help us see and experience what actually happens–to 
us, that is how we might be affected. Auto-fiction, as presented by Knaus-
gård, is a form of negativity that breaks with the dominating urge to 
perform in a particular and measurable way so common in today’s soci-
ety. It is those so-called ideals or norms that Knausgård experiments with.
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My Struggle is a kind of non-doing that seeks nothingness or emptiness 
as a form of liberation from all those performance demands and ideals, 
all the things that make him struggle because of the claustrophobia the 
strict norms of society creates. Non-doing is becoming with whatever 
happens, allowing your body and mind to be filled by life, not something 
useful or good according to certain ideals. For instance, the body takes 
up a lot of space in Knausgård’s work. He cuts himself, he feels fat, he 
swims. He illustrates what Colebrook refers to when she describes the 
body as “a relation to what is not itself, a movement or an activity from 
a point of difference to other points of difference” (2000, 87). Unfortu-
nately, the body has been moralized into acting in a conventional manner. 
“Almost everyone had the same body language ... The effort to maintain 
normality shone out of them” (Knausgård 2011, 204). The socialized or 
moralized body tries to behave correctly; it is an obeyed body. Con-
versely, a body without organs (or your constant striving to become a 
BwO) is constantly becoming a body capable of incorporating more. 
Becoming, then, is a radical process of depersonalization. One becomes 
by one’s capacity to incorporate others or the world. It is no longer a 
matter of his, Knausgård’s, life, but life as such. This is, I believe, what 
Knausgård refers to as selflessness and what Deleuze and Guattari call a 
BwO.
Selflessness is intimately tied with freedom, freedom as becoming. Here, 
you let go of all previous norms or ideals, but you do not let go of what 
happens. Freedom, therefore, is both resistance and creation, for example, 
creating a plane in which something that today is ignored can be expressed, 
actualized, etc. Or it is resistance to what keeps it imprisoned, that is, 
hindering it from expressing itself freely. Thus, freedom is not just a choice 
between two already given possibilities; rather it is a choice about which 
potentials or virtualities to actualize. It consists of two steps. The first is 
to let go of what makes us sad and drags us down by, alternatively, trying 
to affirm that which brings life and joy. That is the constitution of expe-
rience. The second step is to eliminate the possibility of something poten-
tially destructive coming into being or actualizing what is in the midst of 
becoming a joyous experience. The constitution of reality.
Therefore, to make a BwO is not only to be open to changes but also 
to facilitate those changes, to manifest Nietzsche’s “will to power” as a 
“will to create” (Deleuze 2002). The BwO is “a leap forward,” as Braid-
otti says, “toward a creative reinvention of life conditions, affectivity, and 
figurations for the new kind of subjects we have already become” (2011, 53).
Ramon Llull Journal_12.indd   67 21/7/21   13:32
68 RAMON LLULL JOURNAL OF APPLIED ETHICS 2021. ISSUE 12 PP.!55-70
The term “already become” emphasizes the capacity to say “this will 
be” by actualizing this particular life condition here and now. The term 
“already become” also illustrates the imaginative and creative power (i.e., 
the potential) to affirm.
CONCLUSION
The BwO is organized like a selflessness machine that creates a new 
reality, actualizing new ways of being. If everything is a machine, every-
thing is also in the midst of becoming something else due to its connections 
or relationality.
Still, the BwO is not about feeling connected to something particular, 
as if such a connection would give your life purpose. Rather, you relate 
to life neutrally and explore what new forms of life it may open the way 
for. It is a test as well as a development of your capacity to relate with life 
as such, to absorb it – here, Knausgård serves as an example.
Thus, the way to make yourself a BwO is to relate to life as such and 
then affirm what brings more life to life, that is, making our experiences 
more real, more directly connected with life without the filter of moral-
ity. Philosophy, in that sense, is risky business. To believe is to relate in 
an experimental and curious way (i.e., what is also possible?).
The BwO is a body not being subjected to internal or external evalu-
ation according to predefined standards or objectives. Becoming is an 
ongoing movement that constantly questions what interrupts, breaks, or 
destroys the process of becoming. To make a body without organs is to 
be engaged in the present, ‘in order to affect qualitative changes’ (Braid-
otti 2011, 19), and it is in that way that auto-fiction can help us overcome 
our “selves.” In the end, My Struggle is a work of fiction.
Philosophy is an ongoing ethical struggle with life, that is, to be wor-
thy of what happens to us as well as trying to pass on what you can 
never really have: life.
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